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Abstract
Under dynamic efficiency, a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension scheme helps the current
generation of retirees but hurts future generations because they are forced to save via a
return-dominated scheme. Abandoning it is deemed welfare-improving but typically
not for all generations. But what if agents are present-biased (hence, undersave for
retirement) and the “paternalistically motivated forced savings” component of a PAYG
scheme motivated its existence in the first place? This paper shows it is possible to
transition from such a PAYG scheme on to a higher return, mandated fully-funded
scheme; yet, no generation is hurt in the process. The results inform the debate on policy
design of pension systems as more and more policy makers push for the transition to take
place but are forced to recognize that current retirees may get hurt along the way.
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1. Introduction
Old-age pension programs are ubiquitous. Most have a significant unfunded,
pay-as-you-go (PAYG) component: the working generations pay taxes to pay for a
transfer (pension) to the retired, elderly. Many of these programs have survived a
century and often absorb 5–10% of GDP. Yet, their raison d’être is a matter of some
academic debate [Blake (2006)].
Not just academic. In recent times, the continued survival of the PAYG system is in
jeopardy: half of all Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) countries, including the classic welfare states of Scandinavia, have
undertaken sharp reductions in public pension promises and “have already moved or
are moving towards a more diversified system, where pay-as-you-go pensions need to
be complemented with fully funded pension arrangements…” [OECD (2012)].
Today, funded pension schemes play a significant role in the Netherlands, Canada,
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and Denmark. In Appendix A, we outline the developments in Denmark as an example
of a transition from a system relying mainly on PAYG pensions to one where funded
schemes have taken on a substantial role.
The academic debate starts with Aaron (1966) and Samuelson (1975) who show
there is no long-run welfare justification for introducing a permanent PAYG pension
program if the economy is initially dynamically efficient. By their logic, PAYG
pensions crowd out private saving, and therefore, can have a welfare rationale only in
dynamically inefficient economies, those with a capital-overaccumulation problem.
Since most real-world economies are thought of as dynamically efficient, the Aaron–
Samuelson result leaves one wondering, why are PAYG pensions so popular, or more
bluntly, why not get rid of them and adopt mandated, fully funded (FF) schemes
which offer higher returns under dynamic efficiency?
The literature quickly moved on to a variant of the above questions: how can the
economy engineer a transition from an existing PAYG system to a FF one? And
could such a move constitute a Pareto improvement? The answer is no, since there
would be cohorts that paid into the PAYG system but will not see a benefit in return
after the system is demolished. They would have to carry a “two-fold burden: paying
for the pensions of the retired and accumulating a sufficient stock of capital from
which their own pensions could be financed”1 [Brunner (1996); Feldstein (1998)].
This paper shows that a Pareto-improving transition from an existing PAYG system
to a mandated FF scheme is possible. In other words, the “two-fold burden” can be
overcome, and all along the transition, no generation is hurt relative to what their
lives would have been had the PAYG scheme continued.
To pull this off, we utilize a popular, albeit paternalistic, rationale for pensions—
present bias, specifically myopia—one that is preference-based (and widely
observed).2,3 Following Chetty (2015), we posit that individuals are comprised of
multiple selves, in conflict with one another, and that there is a cleft between a self’s
“true preferences” (experienced utility), that which he uses to determine how much
he should save, versus his “choice” or “behavioral” preferences (decision utility), that
which determines how much he actually saves. The idea is that a self-aware person
would seek commitment devices, such as pensions, to help his future selves conform
to his true wishes about retirement saving—see Summers (1989), Laibson et al.
(1998), and Kaplow (2008). In such a setting, by installing a PAYG scheme, a
1The literature noted this—see Breyer (1989), Breyer and Straub (1993), Brunner (1996), Sinn (2000),
Lindbeck and Persson (2003), and Blake (2006) and references therein.
2Falk et al. (2018) study global variation in economic preferences using the Global Preference Survey
(GPS), an experimentally validated survey dataset of time preference, etc. from 80,000 individuals in 76
countries. In one query, participants were asked, “Would you rather receive amount x today or y in 12
months?” Their analysis of the data reveals substantial heterogeneity in preferences and evidence of
present-bias across countries.
3Why myopia? “There seems to be an unstated belief that, left to their own devices, a sizeable fraction of
households would inadequately save and insure” [Kotlikoff (1987)]. Researchers—Feldstein (1985)—have
argued that insufficient foresight (myopia) may be blamed, and PAYG pensions, via the forced-saving
element inherent in them, may help such agents save adequately for retirement. In fact, such
“paternalistically motivated forced savings constitutes an important, and to some the most important,
rationale for social security retirement systems” [Kaplow (2008)]. Although it is true that myopia can, to
some extent, explain the undersaving, Andersen and Bhattacharya (2011) argue that it is a leap from
there to argue that forced saving via PAYG pensions is the cure: only if agents are sufficiently myopic
will they welcome PAYG pensions.
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paternalistic government working off of “true” preferences would benefit myopic agents
(who, under laissez faire, save “too little” for retirement) by raising their retirement
consumption—an efficiency gain that emerges because the “impact” of myopia is
reduced.4 Such a move has the added benefit that it gets to work right from the start,
helping the current retirees who had saved too little in the past—a welfare gain.
With a PAYG scheme in place, how would a Pareto-improving transition to a
mandated FF scheme work? The inaugural young would face mandated contributions
to the FF scheme. The “two-fold burden” is alive. The mandate would have to be
such that (a) the erstwhile promised PAYG pension to the current retirees is
financed, and (b) the young save for their own retirement. The latter generates a
welfare gain (in true utility terms) for those who would choose to save too little for
retirement on their own. Additionally, under dynamic efficiency, the FF scheme
offers a higher return than in the PAYG world. Taken together, this generates a tail
wind, a welfare gain for the inaugural young, which means under the Pareto
criterion, their PAYG benefit maybe reduced [parenthetically, the next young’s PAYG
(FF) contribution can be reduced (increased)]. The initial generation of retirees is
unaffected, whereas future generations contribute less and less to (and receive less
and less from) the PAYG and lean more toward the higher return, FF scheme.
Eventually, the former is phased out, the latter holds sway, and no generation is hurt
along the transition.5
Our analysis informs the discussion on pension policy design currently under way;
specifically, PAYG programs are being challenged on efficiency grounds in many
countries. Policy makers recognize that establishing/expanding funded schemes takes
decades (see Appendix A); not to mention, they do not help support current
retirees.6 How, then, should a country usher in old-age security policies? Should it,
for example, simply start things off with a FF scheme? Or, should it introduce a
PAYG and a FF scheme sequentially, even though the former generates lower
returns? Starting from laissez faire, introducing a FF scheme generates efficiency
gains for sure but fails to address the “immediate need” of the current, retired.7 Our
suggestion would be to usher in a PAYG and a FF scheme sequentially. The former
enhances welfare of the current, retired; it also raises true utility relative to choice
utility under laissez faire by raising retirement consumption and weakening the effect
of myopia. Once that transition is complete, or even somewhere along that
transition, the FF scheme can be introduced and the PAYG scheme can start being
phased out. The FF starts to take over the role of helping agents with their
self-control problems; additionally, it generates efficiency gains. In this way, this
paper shows a way to reconcile the immediate needs of current pensioners alive
4“It is inadequate and potentially misleading to study the effects of Social Security in models in which
there is no particular reason for Social Security to exist in the first place” [Diamond (2004)].
5Matters are considerably more complex when factor prices (wages and interest rates) are endogenously
determined. Our results in section 5 confirm that the basic insights carry forward into this case.
6In some countries, there has even been a retreat in that resources from funded schemes are being
transferred to current pensioners. Examples include Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania
where a larger share of the contributions are allocated to the PAYG scheme, and Argentina and
Hungary having dissolved funded schemes [OECD (2015, 2017)].
7In the case of the United States: “The Social Security Act established two types of provisions for old-age
security: (1) Federal aid to the States to enable them to provide cash pensions to their needy aged, and (2) a
system of Federal old-age benefits for retired workers. The first measure was designed to provide immediate
assistance to destitute aged individuals” (https://www.ssa.gov/history/50ed.html).
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under an inefficient, unfunded scheme with the long-run aim of establishing an
efficient, funded scheme.8
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature whereas
section 3 lays out the model in its general form, allowing for both exogenous and
endogenous factor prices. It derives the agents’ decision rules whereas section 4
studies the long-run optimal choices of schemes as well as the transition from a
PAYG to a FF system assuming exogenous factor prices, the expositionally easier
case to study. Section 5 describes the same for endogenous factor prices. Some
concluding remarks are listed in section 6. Proofs of all major results are to be found
in the appendices.
2. Literature review
A quick review of the surrounding literature is in order. To start with, in the literature
on time-inconsistent agents with multi-selves in dynamic conflict, a “sophisticated self”
may seek commitment devices, such as mandatory pensions, to help his future selves
stick to his better judgment about retirement saving—see Summers (1989), Laibson
et al. (1998), İmrohoroğlu et al. (2003), Fehr et al. (2008), and Kaplow (2008). The
agent uses the commitment device, ends up with more retirement wealth, and is
made better off. The quantitative side to these issues is studied in Kumru et al.
(2011) and Caliendo and Gahramanov (2013). At the same time, it is well
understood that, under perfect capital markets, individuals can offset the mandated
saving (inherent in PAYG systems) by reducing their own saving—if need be, even
borrow against their future pension wealth—leaving total retirement savings
unchanged, and inadequate, just as before. Andersen and Bhattacharya (2011) show
that the mandated part crowds out voluntary saving and only if they are sufficiently
myopic does a welfare case arise.
There is a large literature on the possibility of transiting from PAYG pensions to FF
pensions. That literature assumes that a PAYG scheme is in place and discusses whether
a transition to FF is possible under the Pareto criterion even though there is no welfare
rationale for the PAYG in the first place. Moreover, it assumed that voluntary
retirement savings is adequate which means this literature is detached from the other
branch of the pension literature focusing on “under saving.”
Sinn (2000)—others, such as Feldstein (1998) and Feldstein and Liebman (2002)
make similar points—argues that the cost of PAYG pension has to be recovered by
future generations either as an implicit debt in the PAYG pension scheme (the
return difference is the implicit tax to pay the initial debt) or an explicit debt. It
cannot be escaped by transition; once the PAYG scheme has been implemented, it
has inevitable consequences. A reduction of tax distortions has been suggested as a
side-benefit which may make transition possible under the Pareto criterion, see
Breyer and Straub (1993). The idea is that contributions to PAYG pensions distort
labor supply, whereas contribution to a FF scheme does not. The former does not
8Interestingly the famous Beveridge report proposed a mandatory funded pension scheme, where
contributions paid over the work–life were to be set on an actuarial basis to ensure the pension would
be above some absolute poverty threshold. This scheme was not introduced since it would offer no
pensions to those already old, something which could be achieved by the universal PAYG pension, see
e.g., Bozio et al. (2010). Bismarck’s initial idea was also to establish a funded scheme, but for the same
reason as in the UK, the scheme was set-up as a PAYG scheme, see Scheubel (2013).
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have an individualized link between contributions and entitlements, whereas the latter
has—see Homburg (1990), Breyer and Straub (1993), and Fenge (1995). Damjanovic
(2006) provides an overview. Hence, a transition may lower tax distortions thereby
producing gains which can be used to make the transition feasible under the Pareto
criterion.
In a highly influential paper, Boldrin and Montes (2005), and later Andersen and
Bhattacharya (2017), argue that PAYG schemes may have been introduced for a
good reason, and as such, may play other significant roles, besides their role as a
pension program.9 In their view, PAYG pensions are best viewed,
non-paternalistically, as one arm in a two-armed, intergenerational welfare state, the
other arm being public education. Their central insight is to bring the two arms
together: tax the working, middle-aged to finance public education for the young
and offer those middle-aged a compensating pension when old paid for by the
publicly-educated next cohort of middle-aged.10 Viewed this way, Andersen and
Bhattacharya (2017) argue that a PAYG pension scheme is to be viewed as the
just compensation to the retired for prior financing of public education, and in
the presence of an intergenerational education externality, “once it has served its
purpose, it can be phased out and that too in a Pareto-improving manner.”
Bishnu et al. (2020) take this line of thinking further and derive the optimal
path for subsidies to education and public pensions, not just a Pareto-improving
path.
This paper takes to heart the following ideas from Boldrin and Montes (2005) and
Andersen and Bhattacharya (2017): (a) it is important that any discussion of a
transition to fully-funded systems must include a rationale for introducing the PAYG
scheme in the first place, and (b) the transition must be Pareto-improving. In this
paper, we argue that the construct of a two-armed welfare state is not necessary to
satisfy (a) and (b) above.
Privatization of PAYG schemes is analyzed in a number of quantitative analyses—see
e.g., Fehr et al. (2008), Nishiyama and Smetters (2007, 2014), Werding and Primorac
(2018), Frassi et al. (2019), and Kumru and Thanopoulos (2011) and it is found that
this is generally not possible under the Pareto criterion. These studies also include
various reasons for having a PAYG-pension scheme, including present-biased
preferences as well as insurance of both income and longevity.
A number of quantitative studies have considered the transition path following
pension reform, including a privatization of PAYG schemes, see Kotlikoff (1996),
Nishiyama and Smetters (2005, 2007, 2014), Fehr and Habermann (2008) and Fehr
et al. (2008). The procedure here is, first find the equilibrium trajectory and
associated life-time utility for current and future cohorts given the reform. Then, in a
9More broadly, social security serves multiple functions: it is a pension (or old-age support) program, it
provides insurance (e.g., dependent survivor benefits), and it also brings about income redistribution—see
Barr and Diamond (2006) and Krueger and Kubler (2006). As Barnett et al. (2018) argue, “[…] while a
social security system may touch on all three roles, its principal identity is (and has always been)
intergenerational, its chief function, pension provision to the elderly. To reiterate, in its identity and
function as the chief intermediator of intergenerational transfers, social security is unique.”
10In a dynamically efficient economy, PAYG pensions are long-run undesirable to future generations but
are easier to introduce because of the aforementioned gift to the initial retired generation. On the other
hand, public education is long-run desirable (especially if it contributes to human capital externalities)
but troublesome to usher in because the current generation, educated under the previous regime, will be
asked to finance it for the next generation but will see no benefit especially if they are not altruistic.
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separate simulation, impose lump-sum transfers or taxes to equalize post-reform
life-time utilities to pre-reform utilities. If the present value of these lump-sum taxes/
transfers is positive, the Hicks–Kaldor criterion ensuring the possibility of a welfare
improvement is satisfied, i.e., the gainers from the reform can, potentially,
compensate the losers. These compensations are hypothetical in the sense that were
they to be actually implemented, as part of the policy package, the post-reform
equilibrium trajectory and associated utilities would be different than the ones used
in the Hicks–Kaldor criterion calculations. Our approach differs because we
implement the actual policy and explicitly impose that utilities should be no less
than in the pre-reform case along the actual, not hypothetical, transition path. This is
a non-trivial task when market returns are endogenous.
Finally, there is a large body of work—Kaganovich and Zilcha (2012), Ono and
Uchida (2016), Lancia and Russo (2016), and Bishnu and Wang (2017)—that studies
the political economy of coexistence of the twin institutions of public education and
public pensions but is not concerned with the transition from PAYG to FF pensions.
3. The model economy
We begin by laying out the model in its general form with endogenous factor prices and
use it to present results both for exogenous and endogenous factor prices. The model is
also set-up to allow for pensions to be PAYG and/or FF.
3.1 Primitives
Consider a closed, market economy, in the tradition of Diamond (1965), wherein, at
each date t = 1, 2, …, ∞, a continuum of identical two period-lived agents is born.
There is no population growth and the size of a cohort of newborns at any date is
held fixed at 1.11 Agents consume both as young and old but work only as young.
When old, they are retired: they consume whatever they have and die. When young,
agents work in competitive labor markets at a wage w, consume, and save (s) for old
age in perfect capital markets at the gross rate
Assumption 1 (Dynamic efficiency)
Rt+1 > 1∀t
between t and t + 1. In section 5, we allow for market-determined, endogenous factor
prices. There, the single final good is produced using a standard neoclassical
production function F(Kt, Lt) where Kt denotes the capital input and Lt denotes the
labor input at t. The final good can either be consumed in the period it is produced,
or it can be saved to yield capital at the beginning of the following period. Capital is
assumed to depreciate 100% between periods. Let kt≡ Kt/Lt denote the capital–labor
ratio (capital per young agent). Then, output per young agent at time t may be
expressed as f(kt) where f(kt)≡ F(Kt/Lt, 1) is the intensive production function. We
assume f(0) = 0, f
′
> 0, and f
′ ′
< 0, and that the usual Inada conditions hold. Until
further notice though, we focus on exogenously-specified and constant w and R.
11In section 5.6, we allow for exogenous population growth. The qualitative nature of our results does not
change, though.
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Following Chetty (2015), we draw a distinction between the “true” and “choice”
utility of agents. Agents’ behavior is dictated by their choice utility, but their actual
well-being, our measure of welfare, is governed by their true lifetime utility. Let cy
denote consumption as young, and co consumption as old. The “true” preferences of
the cohort who are young in period t, denoted with a “*”, is the standard, separable
V∗t;u(c
y
t )+ b∗u(cot+1) (1)
where b∗ [ (0, 1] is the true discount factor. The felicity function u( · ) is assumed to
fulfill standard assumptions, including u′( · ) > 0 and u′′( · ) < 0 and Inada conditions.
At points below, we will use the CES form: u(c) = c1−f/(1− f).
Our yardstick for welfare is Ω*. The choice preferences when young are given as
Vt ; u(c
y
t )+ bu(cot+1) and myopia arises when
Assumption 2 (Myopia)
b < b∗
which is assumed, henceforth.
The (marginal rate of substitution (MRS) measures the rate at which an agent
wishes to substitute second-period consumption for first-period consumption. In
our case, the choice MRS of an agent is given by −u′(cy)/βu′(co) and the true
MRS is −u′(cy)/β*u′(co). A myopic agent places less weight on the future (β < β*), and
therefore, cares relatively more about current consumption. Hence, the compensation
(in second-period consumption) he seeks for giving up a unit of first-period
consumption is higher the more myopic he is. His true indifference curve is flatter than
his choice indifference curve.
The government is immune to the myopia of agents and is paternalistic—it decides
on policy action using Ω*. All young agents have access to a government-intermediated
pension scheme wherein they contribute a lump-sum amount τt at date t and receive a
pension of bt+1 at t + 1. A PAYG pension satisfies bt = τt (since the net population
growth rate is assumed zero) whereas a fully-funded (FF) pension has bt = Rτt−1.
12
Note that a myopic agent perceives the effective return on private saving as Rβ, and
that on the PAYG scheme as β. To the government, these returns are higher, Rβ*
and β*, respectively.
To get a rough intuitive sense of where we are headed, focus attention on Figure 1.
The choice utility is shown by the red indifference curve. Given the initial budget set,
the agent chooses point A. The true utility is given by the green indifference curve. The
optimal bundle from the point of true utility is A* which has more co and less cy than at
A. Government intervention via pension schemes, can, in principle, pivot the budget set
(the details are fleshed out below) so that the new chosen bundle is B on the dotted
budget line. This would have more co and less cy than at A, the bundle under laissez
faire. Point B has higher true utility than point A does. In fact, we show below that a
12Mandatory savings funds have access to the same capital market products as do private savers, and
hence the returns are assumed to be identical. It may be argued that mandated schemes can deliver
higher risk-adjusted net returns due to lower marketing and transactions (economies of scale) costs. On
the other hand, the governance structure may distort the objectives of the investment policies in
mandated pension funds. These governance-related issues discussed in Atkinson (1995) are beyond the
scope of the current paper.
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suitably designed FF scheme can get agents to the bundle A*, something a PAYG
scheme cannot.
3.2 Decision rules
The budget constraints of an agent are
cyt = wt − tt − st , (2)
cot+1 = Rt+1st + bt+1. (3)
The private saving decision is determined by
u′(wt − tt − st) = bRt+1u′(Rt+1st + bt+1) for st > 0, (4)
and at the zero private-saving corner by
u′(wt − tt) > bRt+1u′(bt+1) for st = 0. (5)
In line with the pension literature, st≥ 0 is imposed. Agents do not have any wage
income as old; all they have is either interest income from prior savings or pension
payouts. Allowing negative saving is tantamount to allowing borrowing against future
Figure 1. True vs. choice utility under pension schemes.
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pensions which we disallow; in any case, such borrowing is not possible/allowed in many
countries.13,14









for st > 0.
(6)







a standard condition, well-known in the literature. Henceforth, we assume this is true.
In the absence of a pension scheme (τ = b = 0), the private saving decision satisfies
u
′
(wt− st) = Rt+1βu
′
(Rt+1st). In this case, the non-negativity constraint on saving is
never binding because of Inada conditions. If β = 0, then, of course, st = 0 is possible;
not otherwise. From the perspective of true utility, the optimal savings level s∗t satisfies
u′(wt − s∗t ) = Rt+1b∗u′(Rt+1s∗t ). (8)
Myopia implies people place less weight on the future (β < β*), and therefore, care
relatively more about current consumption—such agents save too little, i.e., st < s∗t .
Indeed, ∂st/∂β > 0 holds implying as β falls (the agent is more myopic), the less he
saves, and the gap between his choice and true saving (st vs. s∗t ) increases.
15 It is
important to note that, in spite of ∂st/∂β > 0, sufficiently high myopia (low-enough
but still β > 0) will not drive agents to the zero-saving corner; since b = 0, and the
agent earns nothing when old, Inada conditions will prevent that. For future use,
note that when b > 0, sufficiently high myopia will drive agents to the own
zero-saving corner.
13Andersen and Bhattacharya (2019) consider the possibility of borrowing, but at a rate higher than the
savings rate. The return difference generates a “corner” solution for the savings decision. The current paper
implicitly assumes an infinite borrowing rate. In Andersen and Bhattacharya (2019), it is shown that there
is no welfare case for compelling the individual to borrow in response to a high mandated savings
requirement. As such, there is no loss in generality from the approach taken here.
14We focus solely on one savings motive, the lifecycle motive, and do not consider precautionary or
other motives. The entire model is deterministic and, as such, there are no income shocks that could
unexpectedly constrain the liquidity of agents. Furthermore, there is no extra demand for liquidity as in
the theory portion of Chetty et al. (2014).
15This neatly captures the argument that present-biased agents “under-save”—leaving “too little” for
old-age consumption relative to what their true self wants.
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4. A role for pensions?
4.1 PAYG
The government is aware that a change in pension benefits affects private saving via
changes in the agent’s after-tax endowment and his future income. Focus attention
on a steady state. The government takes the agent’s optimal saving response to its
pension into account, s(b) and mandates a pension b by maximizing Ω*(b) = u(w− s
(b)− b) + β*u(Rs(b) + b). The optimal level of b, if positive, is defined as the solution to
dV∗(b)
db
= −u′(cy) 1+ ∂s(b)
∂b
[ ]





Using u′(cy) = βRu′(co), dΩ*(b)/db reduces to
dV∗(b)
db
















= [1− R] u
′′(cyt )
u′′(cyt )+ bR2u′′(cot+1)
< 0 for st > 0 givenR > 1. (12)
The PAYG pension is designed to supplement an agent’s own saving for retirement.
Recognizing that, the agent cuts his own saving as forced saving via the pension
increases. If the forced pension and his voluntary saving earned the same return, he
would cut his own saving one-for-one in response to an increase in the pension.
However, under dynamic efficiency, an extra unit devoted to the pension brings less
future income than what private saving would have. As such, he does not reduce his
own saving one-for-one; the crowding out—cf. equation (11)—is less than
proportionate with the pension increase. Additionally, the present value of lifetime
income under the pension, w + ((1− R)/R)b falls as b rises (since R > 1), the agent’s
retired consumption falls, cf. equation (12).
Focus attention on equation (10). In the absence of myopia (β = β*), the second term
on the r.h.s. of (10) drops out and hence the sign of dΩ*(b)/db is the same as the sign of
1− R.
Proposition 1 [Aaron (1966); Samuelson (1975)] Under Assumption 1 (dynamic
efficiency), dΩ*(b)/db < 0 if there is no myopia (β = β*) implying there is no welfare
justification for introducing or expanding a PAYG scheme.
Proof. See Appendix B. ▪
In the absence of myopia, then, the optimal PAYG pension is b = 0. The agent
dislikes the fact that his total retirement income, given by Rs(b) + b, falls with a rise
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in b.16 This is clearly not what the government intended. Thankfully, the fall in Rs + b
stops once s hits zero. This is so because of the crowding out of private savings (∂st/
∂b≤ 0 for st > 0); at a sufficiently high level of b, call it b, the corresponding level of
private saving is zero, st = 0. Thereafter, any further raising of b (b ≥ b) has no effect
on s as the non-negativity constraint on s binds—total retirement income is simply b
which clearly rises with b!
The question is, how does the presence of myopia help reinstate a role for PAYG
pensions? Notice when myopia is absent, the second term on the r.h.s. of (10) drops
out implying ∂s(b)/∂b ceases to have any effect on the choice of b. Intuitively, the
envelope theorem washes out the effect of b on s. Not so, when myopia is present.
In that case, the choice self-views the effect of b on s differently from how the true
self does—the true self discounts the effect on future saving at rate β* greater than
the rate at which the choice self-discounts the same.
What about the first term on the r.h.s. of (10)? Since (11) tells us that ∂st/∂b < 0 for
st > 0, it follows, that in the presence of myopia, the second term on the r.h.s. of (10) is
negative. This means, for dΩ*(b)/db > 0 or PAYG pensions to have a shot at improving
true welfare, the first term on the r.h.s. of (10), β*− Rβ, necessarily has to be positive.
Equivalently, a necessary condition for a welfare rationale for PAYG pensions is
sufficiently-strong myopia, β* > Rβ⇔ β < β*/R—ordinary myopia, β < β*, is not
enough!17 Why? This is for the true self to benefit from the pension, the myopic
agent’s perceived effective return on private saving, Rβ, must be at least less than his
true self’s perceived return on the competing PAYG scheme, β*. (In the absence of
myopia, this is not possible under dynamic efficiency.) Otherwise, even the true self
would prefer no pensions.
Even when myopia is sufficiently strong, how big does b need to be? Recall st < s∗t—
from the standpoint of true utility, a myopic agent is anyway saving too little. From
(11), we know the agent cuts st in response to the pension when st > 0. A PAYG
pension crowds out own saving which the true self dislikes, but as b rises beyond b,
consumption during retirement rises and that makes such a b attractive from the
perspective of true utility. Knowing the true self likes b > b, what level of b should the
government choose? In the present setting with exogenous factor prices, there is no
inherent dynamics in the economy. In which case, the pension level may be set, right
away, at its long-run optimal value, the one that solves maxb u(w− b) + β*u(b) where
u′(w− b∗) ; b∗u′(b∗). (13)
Note that b* does not replicate s* (defined in equation (8)). We have
Lemma 1 [Andersen and Bhattacharya (2011)] A necessary condition for the PAYG
pension b* to improve true welfare is β* > βR. For CES utility, a sufficient condition






R+ (Rb)1/f . (14)
16It is easy to check that ∂




17To see this clearly, suppose β* = (1 + ϵ)β where ϵ > 0 but arbitrarily small. Then, β* > β. But β* > βR
requires (1 + ϵ)β > βR⇔ ϵ > R− 1 implying the gap between β and β* cannot be arbitrarily small.
Journal of Demographic Economics 179
Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/dem.2020.13
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Landsbokasafn Islands - Haskolabokasafn, on 16 Nov 2021 at 14:09:28, subject to the
Proof. See Appendix B. ▪
For it to be optimal, the PAYG pension has to be large enough to drive voluntary
private saving to the corner. Increasing the PAYG beyond that point makes it
possible to increase old-age consumption, and thus, counteract the effect of the
myopia. However, since the PAYG scheme is return-dominated, myopia (β*/β > 1)
alone is not enough to deliver a welfare rationale for a PAYG pension. Sufficiently
strong myopia relative to the rate of return (β*/β > R) is required for a welfare
improvement to be possible.
Note from (14) that risk-aversion (or intertemporal substitution) plays a role: if ϕ = 1
or ϕ = 0, then Ω*(b*) =Ω*(0) and in either case, b* does not improve welfare. In
Appendix B, we present a numerical example of a configuration of parameters
satisfying β* > βR that also satisfies (14) for all ϕ∈ (0, 1).
4.1.1 Fully funded pensions
Consider, next, amandated FF pension schemewith contribution rate d (τt = d and bt+1 = Rd).
The FF-pension also crowds out voluntary saving, and since the returns are the same, the
crowding out is one-to-one, i.e., analogous to equation (11), we have
∂s
∂d
= −1 for s > 0.
Hence, a mandated FF pension contribution only affects total saving if it is sufficiently
large, d ≥ d. The critical contribution level d is defined by u′(w− d) ; Rbu′(Rd). The
contribution rate maximizing long-run true welfare is determined by (assuming
voluntary saving is driven to zero, d ≥ d) maxd u(w− d) + β*u(Rd) and the optimal
level d* is determined by the first-order condition
u′(w− d∗) ; Rb∗u′(Rd∗). (15)
Notice d* = s*. This means a FF program with contribution equal to s* can exactly
replicate the desired retirement saving of the true self. Of course, private saving is
zero but retirement saving under the FF scheme is exactly what true utility demands.
It follows directly that
Lemma 2 A FF pension with contribution rate d*—determined by (15)—generates
higher true steady-state utility when compared either to what is possible under laissez
faire (τ = b = 0) or an optimal PAYG pension (b*).
Note, the relationship between the optimal PAYG pension, b*, and the FF pension,
d*, is, in general, ambiguous (b∗ >
<
d∗).18
18The comparison is not trivial: the benefit of a higher return on the FF pension compared to the PAYG
pension has to be weighed against the fact that an income effect may reduce the optimal saving/
contribution level. We have ∂d
∗
∂R = − b
∗u′(Rd∗)+Rb∗u′′(Rd∗)d∗
u′′(w−d∗)+R2b∗u′′(Rd∗) = − b
∗u′(Rd∗)[1−f(co)]
u′′(w−d∗)+R2b∗u′′(Rd∗)where, recall,
f(co) ; −((cou′′(co))/u′(co)) is the measure of relative risk aversion (recall, co = Rd∗). The optimal
mandated savings is increasing in the rate of return (∂d∗/∂R > 0) if the coefficient of relative risk
aversion is less than 1, cf. Assumption 3. This, in turn, implies d∗ > b∗, that is, the optimal FF pension
is larger than the optimal PAYG pension since their size is the same if R = 1.
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4.2 Transition from a PAYG to a FF pension system
A PAYG pension has the advantage that it provides, up-front, the current old with a
pension, and therefore offers an immediate remedy to their low old-age consumption
problem. To that end, suppose the government introduces the long-run optimal
PAYG pension at level b*, cf. (13). From Lemma 2, we know that continuing this
program is not in the interest of long-run welfare: an optimal FF scheme would do
better. The question is: is it possible to make the transition to a FF scheme under
the Pareto criterion, the constraint that utility for each cohort remain at least as high
had the PAYG pension scheme b* persisted?
To operationalize this question, assume that the long-run optimal PAYG scheme
(b*) installed at t and kept in place up to date t +m (m > 0). Recall, this is consistent
with every cohort up to t +m being at the zero private-saving corner. Also recall for b*
to be welfare-improving, agents must display sufficiently strong myopia, i.e., β*/β >R. At
t +m, the government ushers in a FF scheme by mandating the then young to contribute
dt+m > 0 to the scheme. (It is possible that private saving re-emerges, we denote it s(b*,
dt+m)); recall, though, any increase in d is crowded out one-for-one by a decline in s.)
Denote the PAYG pension to be received by these retirees by bt+m+1, i.e., we allow for the
possibility that the level of the PAYG scheme is changed after the FF scheme is
introduced. True life-time utility for the cohort born at t +m under this policy package is
V∗t+m=u(w− b∗−dt+m − s(b∗, dt+m))
+ b∗u(Rs(b∗, dt+m)+ Rdt+m + bt+m+1),
which may be rewritten as
V∗t+m=u(w− b∗−dt+m − s(b∗, dt+m))
+ b∗u(Rs(b∗, dt+m)+ (R− 1)dt+m + dt+m + bt+m+1).
Note that the term (R − 1)dt+m captures the return gain to switching from the PAYG
to the FF scheme. To foreshadow, this extra income/welfare will be crucial for a
successful transition under the Pareto criterion.
The first issue is whether the cohort born at t +m sees a welfare gain from the
mandate of a FF pension contribution, dt+m, on top of their PAYG pension
contribution b*?
Lemma 3 True life-time utility of cohort t +m, V∗t+m, can be improved by mandating






= [R− 1]b∗u′(b∗) > 0 givenR > 1
Proof. See Appendix C. ▪
Note that with the PAYG pension at b*, private saving is already at zero; hence
adding on an incremental FF pension does not distort saving: ∂s(b*, dt+m)/∂dt+m = 0.
The marginal unit earns R via the FF scheme which is better than what it would
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have earned under the PAYG scheme. Hence, on the margin, continuing the initial
PAYG scheme and adding a (small) mandated FF pension makes the inaugural set
of agents better off.
The welfare gain may be used to phase out the PAYG scheme under the Pareto
criterion. Define
V∗PAYGt+m ; u(w− b∗)+ b∗u(b∗)
as the lifetime utility to cohort t +m had the PAYG pension b* continued unchanged. It
follows, that for cohort t +m, the Pareto condition is V∗t+m ≥ V∗PAYGt+m where
V∗t+m;u(w− b∗−dt+m)+ b∗u(Rdt+m + bt+m+1)
where V∗t+m captures the changes ushered in by adding a mandated FF contribution,
dt+m, over and above the PAYG contribution of b* as well as the possibility that this
cohort will see a PAYG benefit of bt+m+1 instead of b*. Lemma 3 implies ∃dt+m > 0
such that V∗t+m ≥ V∗PAYGt+m holds. Then, there exists a bt+m+1 < b* such that
u(w− b∗−dt+m)+ b∗u(Rdt+m + bt+m+1) = u(y − b∗)+ b∗u(b∗) ; V∗PAYGt+m (16)
Hence, the gains from phasing in the FF pension (dt+m > 0) may be used, under
the Pareto criterion, to bring down the level of the return-dominated PAYG pension
(bt+m+1 < b*).
The upshot is that PAYG and mandated FF schemes are both appropriate
government interventions for myopic agents. The FF scheme is just better in the
long run: a unit of funds taken from the PAYG contribution and shifted to the FF
scheme produces a return gain. Yes, in a literal sense, it is true that a transition from
a PAYG to a FF scheme requires some cohorts to “pay twice” but, unlike in the
classical results (see Proposition 1) derived with time-consistent agents, such cohorts
are not worse off.
What happens to generations further down the transition, indexed t +m + j with j > 0?
What does the trajectory of d and b look like under the Pareto criterion? Consider, for the
sake of argument, a very simple, stylized scheme that sets dt+m = κb*, κ∈ (0, 1) so that
dt+m + b∗ = (1+ k)b∗
dt+m+j + bt+m+j = (1+ k)b∗; j > 0
i.e., right from the start of the transition, the overall contribution rate (summed across
both pensions) is raised relative to the PAYG world. (Many other such schemes can be
constructed—see below.) This implies, for example, dt+m+1 = (1 + κ)b*− bt+m+1, that is,
if we generate a declining sequence for bt+m+1, we automatically generate an increasing
sequence for dt+m+1—if the PAYG is phased out, the FF is phased in. The equal utility
condition for period t +m, V∗t+m=V∗PAYGt+m now reads
u(w− (1+ k)b∗)+ b∗u(Rkb∗+bt+m+1) = u(w− b∗)+ b∗u(b∗);
apropos Lemma 3, there exists a κ > 0 ensuring bt+m+1 < b*, the start if the declining
sequence for b. Below, we show it is possible to engineer a transition which leaves
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every cohort along the transition at least as well off as in the counterfactual persistent
PAYG scheme. This is our flagship result.





j=0 implemented at t +m which satisfies the Pareto condition
V∗TRANSITIONt+m+j ;u(w− bt+m+j − dt+m+j)+ b∗u(Rdt+m+j + bt+m+j+1) ≥ V∗PAYGt+m+j
;u(w− b∗)+ b∗u(b∗) > for all j ≥ 0
(17)
with bt+m+j following a decreasing sequence and reaching 0 in finite time, and dt+m+j
following an increasing sequence converging to d*, allowing d* to be implemented.
Proof. See Appendix D. ▪
Along the transition path, the PAYG-pension is gradually phased out, and the FF
pension expanded, ensuring cohorts have the same life-time true utility had the
PAYG-world persisted. Eventually, the PAYG pension is fully phased out (bt+m+j = 0),
and replaced by a FF pension (dt+m+j > 0 for all j≥ 0). Once that happens, all cohorts
are necessarily better off than under the PAYG scheme. Notably, it is possible to
implement d* which delivers the optimal level of saving, s*, from the point of view
of the true self.
Of course, there may be multiple Pareto-improving transition paths. Proposition 2
outlines a particular path where utility for cohorts is kept at the PAYG level until
the pension is fully phased out, after which, subsequent future cohorts get to enjoy
higher utility. Other paths, where some of the future gains are distributed up-front
such that all cohorts are strictly better off, are possible.
5. Endogenous factor prices
Everything up to now has been derived for the case of exogenous factor prices. The
case with endogenous factor prices is more challenging since changes in the pension
system trigger general equilibrium responses to wages and interest rates, which in
turn, impact saving decisions. Recall, our approach differs from usual Kaldor–Hicks
one because we implement the actual policy and explicitly impose that utilities be no
less than in the pre-reform case along the actual, not hypothetical, transition path.
This is a non-trivial task when factor prices are endogenous. However, before we get
there, we settle up some issues regarding dynamic competitive equilibria for this
economy.
5.1 Equilibrium
Henceforth, we assume factor markets are perfectly competitive, and thus, factors of
production are paid their marginal product in each period, i.e.,
Rt+1 = f ′(kt+1) ; R(kt+1) (18)
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and
wt = f (kt)− kt f ′(kt) ; v(kt), (19)
where f ′(kt) > 0 and f ′′(kt) < 0 and, hence R′(kt) = f ′′(kt) < 0 and ω′(kt) =−ktf ′′(kt) =
−ktR′(kt) > 0.






which holds for a standard production function such as the Cobb–Douglas, f (k) = ka,
α∈ (0, 1) where η(k) = α − 1. It also holds for a CES production function f (k) =
[αk(1−σ)/σ + (1 − α)]σ/(σ−1) with α ∈ (0, 1) and σ ≥ 1.
In passing, note that
d(kR(k))
dk
= R(k)+ kR′(k) > 0 ⇔ kR
′(k)
R(k)
> −1 ⇔ h(k) > −1.
This means if k rises, capital income (R(k)*k) also rises if Assumption 4 holds. This
fact will be useful in Propositions 5 and 6.
Throughout, a dynamically-efficient economy is assumed.
Assumption 5
R(kt) > 1 ∀t
The economy without any government intervention—laissez faire—is identical to
that studied in Diamond (1965). We have from (4), and using (18) and (19),
u′(v(kt)− kt+1) = R(kt+1)bu′(R(kt+1)kt+1)
which implicitly defines the equilibrium law of motion for k : kt+1 = ψ(kt, β, 0). In the
case of a time-invariant PAYG scheme (τt = bt+1 = b > 0), the equilibrium condition in
the capital market is kt+1 = st, and hence, we have
u′(v(kt)− kt+1 − b) = R(kt+1)bu′(R(kt+1)kt+1 + b) (20)
which implicitly defines the equilibrium law of motion for k:
kt+1 = c(kt , b, b). (21)
All competitive equilibria with PAYG pensions are characterized by the sequence
{kt+1}1t=1 defined by (21) and the government budget constraint. For a FF scheme
with contribution rate d (τt = d and bt+1 = Rd), the equilibrium condition in the
capital market is kt+1 = st + dt, and hence, the corresponding equilibrium law of
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motion for k is
u′(v(kt)− kt+1) = R(kt+1)bu′(R(kt+1)kt+1).
Define
(1) k: the steady state capital–labor ratio in the absence of any government
intervention, defined as laissez faire, the solution to k = ψ(k, β, 0).
(2) kb: the steady state capital–labor ratio for a given PAYG pension b which solves
kb = ψ(kb, β, b).
(3) k*: the steady state capital–labor ratio in the absence of both myopia and pension
which solves k* = ψ(k*, β*, 0).
We make all standard assumptions ensuring the existence of a unique and stable—
see Appendix E—steady-state equilibrium, see e.g., De la Croix and Michel (2002):
Assumption 6 (Stability)
R′(k)bu′(co)+ R(k)bu′′(co)[R′(k)k+ R(k)] + u′′(cy)[1+ R′(k)k] < 0 (22)
In particular, assume 0 < ψk(k
b, β, b) < 1 (this assumption is necessary for kb—see
below—to be locally stable).
5.2 PAYG pensions
As before, we start by establishing the impact on private saving (or capital) of myopia





R′(kt+1)bu′(cot+1)+ R(kt+1)bu′′(cot+1)[R′(kt+1)kt+1 + R(kt+1)] + u′′(cyt )
> 0
implying the bigger the weight (β) agents assign to the future, the larger the saving due
to consumption smoothing, and therefore larger the capital–labor ratio at any point in







meaning that the PAYG pension crowds out saving and leads to a lower capital–labor
ratio. Assume a PAYG scheme is introduced (unanticipated) in period t such that each
young pays b > 0 (not too large) to each old in that and all future periods. From
equation (23), it follows that upon introduction of the PAYG pension, the capital
stock is declining along the equilibrium trajectory and eventually reaches kb, defined
in section 5.1. Since these results hold in steady state, the next result is immediate.
Lemma 4
kb < k < k∗
Proof. Since ∂k/∂β > 0 (see Appendix E) and β < β*, k is smaller than the capital stock
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in a corresponding economy with non-myopic households. Myopia implies agents save
too little, and hence, the capital stock is lower. Since ∂k/∂b < 0 (see Appendix E), kb is
smaller than the capital stock in the absence of a PAYG pensions system, kb < k. ▪
From Lemma 4, recall k <k* holds, meaning the underlying “undersaving” issue
faced by myopic agents persists in the case with endogenous factor prices: myopic
agents hold too little capital. Under dynamic efficiency (R(k) > 1), if policy action
can incentivize these agents to hold more capital, then steady-state welfare would
rise. The problem, as before, is that a higher pension reduces the capital stock. There
is, however, one big difference as compared to the case with exogenous factor prices.
With endogenous factor prices, as the pension crowds out physical capital, the return
to capital would rise (an effect absent earlier), raising the incentive to hold more of
it. The equilibrium, therefore, has both voluntary savings and the PAYG pension.
Proposition 3 Suppose Assumptions 1–6 hold. (a) For introduction of a PAYG pension
scheme to increase true steady-state welfare over laissez faire, it is necessary that
b∗ > R(k)b
holds, (b) it is possible that, upon introduction, true welfare improves both for the
inaugural generation and for each and every subsequent cohort, and (c) k*
(corresponding to β*) cannot be replicated by a PAYG pension.
Proof. See Appendix F. ▪
It is easy to construct numerical examples where (a) voluntary saving (in the form of
capital) and public pensions co-exist, and (b) the optimal pension is positive even under
dynamic efficiency.
5.3 FF pensions
Under a FF scheme, the decision problem for an individual born in period t is
max
st
Vt = u(wt − st − d)+ bu(Rst + Rd)
Since s and d have the same return, they are perfect substitutes and only total saving
k = s + d matters. It follows that voluntary savings s decreases one-for-one with an
increase in d for s > 0. For d so high that s is driven to the zero corner, we have u
′
(ω
(kt)− d) > βR(kt+1)u
′
(R(kt+1)d).
Proposition 4 Setting mandatory pension savings at the level d = k* > k implements
what the long-run true self wants. Steady-state welfare under such a program is,
therefore, higher than in laissez faire and for any PAYG pension.
The undersaving problem can thus be addressed by a proper choice of the mandated
pension contribution. This, however, is a steady-state result, and therefore not of much
use in solving the immediate problem for households with inadequate savings.
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It is important to note that, in the FF world, even though the entire capital stock is
being held by the pension funds, the ownership of these funds lies with the agents (via
individual accounts) and not the government.
5.4 Transition to a fully-funded system
Is it possible with endogenous factor prices to make a transition from a PAYG to a FF
system under the Pareto criterion so that no cohorts are made worse off along the
transition path?
5.4.1 Gain from introducing a FF pension
Let the PAYG pension scheme b be introduced in period t. Is there at some point in
time—during adjustment to steady state or in the new steady state—a welfare gain
from introducing a FF pension? To answer this question, consider introduction of a
mandatory contribution larger than the initial capital stock, dt+m > kt+m in period t +m,
implying full crowding out of private savings (st+m = 0 and kt+m+1 = dt+m), where the
capital is predetermined at its value at t +m. We have
Proposition 5 At any point in time t +m, m > 0 after the introduction of the PAYG
pension scheme, true life-time utility V∗t+m can be improved by introducing a FF




Proof. See Appendix G. ▪
The assumption on η(kt+m)—see Assumption 4—ensures that the return to capital is
not “too sensitive” to the capital stock. Sufficiently-strong myopia (β* > β/(1 + η)) is
necessary and sufficient for phasing in of a FF pensions system (dt+m > 0) to have
positive welfare effects on all subsequent cohorts.19 Assuming this holds, it is
possible to reduce the PAYG pension while satisfying the Pareto condition, i.e., there
exists a bt+m+1 < b and dt+m > kt+m such that
V∗t+m;u(v(kt+m)− b− dt+m)+ b∗u(R(kt+m+1)dt+m + bt+m+1) = V∗PAYGt+m .
This is the first step in a transition out of the PAYG scheme.
5.4.2 Complete phasing out of PAYG pensions
To work out an explicit case with full phasing out of a PAYG pension under the Pareto
criterion, we first analyze an economy that has reached a steady-state with a PAYG
pension b > 0 and the associated capital stock, kb, and associated life-time utility,
Ω*PAYG.20 At t +m > t, an unanticipated announcement is made that a phasing out of
the PAYG scheme and a transition to a FF system is underway with a goal of
achieving the optimal long-run level of capital d = k*.
19Note when η = 0 (R
′
(k) = 0) the condition reduces to β* > β, cf. the finding for the case with exogenous
factor prices (Lemma 3).
20The capital stock is determined by the first-order condition for savings u
′
(ω(kb)− kb− b) = R(kb)βu
′
(R
(kb)kb + b) and the associated welfare level Ω*PAYG≡ u(ω(kb)− kb− b) + β*u(R(kb)kb + b).
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We are looking for a policy sequence {bt+m+j, dt+m+j}1j=0 which satisfies the Pareto
condition
V∗TRANSITIONt+m+j ;u(v(kt+m+j)− bt+m+j − dt+m+j)
+ b∗u(R(kt+m+j+1)dt+m+j + bt+m+j+1) ≥ V∗PAYGt+m+j ( j ≥ 0)
where kt+m = k
b and kt+m+j+1 = dt+m+j, implies
bt+m = b > bt+m+1 > bt+m+2 > · · · > · · · = 0
and the introduction of increasing contribution to or phasing in of the FF pensions
system:
kb < dt+m < dt+m+1 < dt+m+2 < · · · < · · · < d = k∗
i.e., the pension to the current old (in period t +m) is the pension from the PAYG
regime and the current young finance this, where the contribution is at the PAYG
steady state level. The current young are also required to contribute to the FF
scheme with a contribution dt+m.
Proposition 5 gives conditions ensuring that cohort t +m are better off when a FF
pension is introduced on top of the PAYG pension. Under the Pareto criterion, this
welfare gain may be used to bring down the PAYG pension this cohort receives (without
hurting them). The next cohort sees an increase in their wage income due to a higher
capital stock. That, as well as the reduced contribution to the PAYG pension, enables
further increases in FF pension contribution resulting in additional increases in the
capital stock and enabling a greater reduction in the PAYG pension they receive. Hence,
the first step has more savings and a reduction in the PAYG pension. Downstream the
change in savings and thus the capital stock also affects wage. Cohort t +m + 1 will have
a higher wage rate because the capital stock has increased (compared to status quo), and
this make them better-off. Under the Pareto condition this creates room to decrease the
PAYG pension further. Working out this dynamics in detail generates the following result.
Proposition 6 Assume the transition starts from a steady-state equilibrium with a
PAYG pension b and associated capital, kb. Under the assumptions—see Assumption 4
—that η(kb) >−1 and β* > β/(1 + η(kb)) there exists a trajectory satisfying the Pareto
criterion, where the PAYG pension is entirely phased out, and the FF pension
expanded so that k* is reached in the long run.
Proof. See Appendix H. ▪
The above shows the existence of a transition path assuming that the economy is
initially in steady state equilibrium with a PAYG pension b. The result can be
considerably generalized.





for j ≥ 0
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where






Then there exists a trajectory satisfying the Pareto criterion, where the PAYG pension
is phased out, and the FF pension is expanded.
Proof. See Appendix I. ▪
The bottom line is this. Starting from an initial setting with a PAYG pension in
place, it is possible to replace it with another mandated scheme, the FF scheme,
which not only preserves (even increases) the benefits of the PAYG in terms of its
forced-saving character but also generates a higher return. And along the transition,
no one is hurt. Note that once the PAYG scheme is fully phased out, cohorts further
downstream are made strictly better off.
5.5 Intuition
We now summarize our intuition about the entire transition. There are many parts,
many moving parts, so we approach each one in turn. Suppose a standard Diamond
economy is at a laissez faire (LF) steady state with k = kLF. Since this was reached
under choice preferences and agents are myopic, it is clear that kLF < k* where k* is
the level of k attainable under true preferences. At any date under LF, all retirees
have too low retirement consumption (relative to what they would have had under
true preferences) because they saved too little due to their myopia (Figure 2).
Figure 2. Transitions.
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Now, suppose the government starts an optimal PAYG scheme, bt, one derived by
maximizing true utility. The scheme, by its very nature, transfers resources from the
young to the retired. The young respond by cutting their own saving even further
but they end up with more retirement consumption. Their choice utility does not
like this but under true preferences, they are made better off. Because saving is
increasing in its return, and the PAYG scheme is return-dominated, the latter does
not lead to complete crowding out of private saving. Also, the initial old at the point
the policy was initiated are made better off because the pension they receive from
the initial young is higher than their LF retirement saving. Downstream, all future
generations have higher true utility than under the LF.
At some point, the PAYG transition is completed and a new steady state, kPAYG is
reached. By that time, bt has converged to its steady state level, b*. To reiterate, this
point has higher true utility than at kLF, lower personal savings but higher retirement
consumption. The retirees are receiving b*. Now, the government initiates a FF
scheme, asking the young at that date to not only contribute b* for the current
retired but also mandate them to contribute d1 into the FF program. Since d and k
earn the same return, they are perfect substitutes: a rise in d leads to a one-for-one
decrease in k, so that, in fact, k1 = d1 > k
PAYG. In other words, d1 ensures complete
crowding out of personal savings. (Recall, by assumption, they cannot borrow.) In
effect, their myopia is rendered impotent. This, recall, is not achieved under the
PAYG scheme. It is in this sense that the FF scheme is better at “managing” myopia
than the PAYG scheme.
This mandate also does several things. It raises downstream w but lowers
downstream R (but even with the reduced R, agents benefit from getting a return R
on their contributions vs. 1 in the PAYG scheme). Overall, under the conditions laid
out in Proposition 6 (the ones relating to sufficiently strong myopia and low η) there
is a welfare gain, and under the Pareto criterion, this can be “taxed away” and a
PAYG b < b* can be offered to these young. The transition proceeds with d rising
and b falling until a point where b = 0; the PAYG scheme is fully phased out and all
that remains are mandated pension contributions, d*. As we have shown in
Proposition 6, d* can even replicate k*.
5.6 Numerics
Below, we undertake a short computational analysis to showcase some of the crucial
features of the transitional dynamics. The idea is not to conduct a serious calibration
exercise but rather to offer some broad brushstrokes and quantitative insights within
the confines of our two-period model. The exercise serves two purposes. It allows us
to include population growth, and also helps us demonstrate the empirical relevance
of the transition we have derived.
Consider a baseline economy where f (k) = Aka and V∗t;(cyt )1−f/(1− f)+
b∗((cot+1)
1−f/(1− f)) and Vt ; (cyt )1−f/(1− f)+ b((cot+1)1−f/(1− f)). There are
five primary parameters to choose, ϕ, β, β*, α, and A. We set them as follows: ϕ =
0.8, β = 0.2, β* = 0.9, α = 0.22, and A = 5. A and α are chosen to deliver a 30-year
interest rate of near 2.5 (or an annual real interest rate of around 3%). A discount
factor of β = 0.2 implies an annual, one-period discount rate of 6%. We chose a
relatively high β* to show that we could implement policies that take the economy
close to the Golden rule. The average ratio of public pensions plus old-age cash
benefits to GDP across OECD countries in the past three decades has been about
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5%. We chose ϕ to come close to that number. In one setting, we allow for population
growth 1 + n where n is set to 0.2 (annualized rate of 0.6% close to OECD averages in
the past three decades). Below, we present some additional examples.
We report results from three sets of experiments. In the first, the economy is at a
steady state with retirees receiving, b*, the optimal PAYG pension. The transition
starts with the inaugural young generation being asked to pay b* to the current
retirees and contribute dt to the FF scheme. As explained in the text, we go on to
compute the sequence of bt+j and dt+j ensuring lifetime utility during the transition is
held equal to the lifetime utility at the pre-policy steady state. Once the bt+j sequence
has been fully phased out, we allow the resulting welfare gains to accrue to future
generations. The second experiment is the same as just described, except for the
transition starts at some date before the steady state under the PAYG scheme has been
reached. And the last experiment is like the first except we allow for population growth.
5.6.1 Transitions
In the first experiment, the mandated contribution is introduced and gradually stepped
up, see Figure 3a. At first, the PAYG pension can only be reduced marginally under the
Pareto condition. Downstream when the gains from having contributed to the FF
scheme become larger, the PAYG pension can be reduced more sharply, and
eventually fully phased out, and the optimal steady state FF contribution fully phased in.
From the point where the PAYG pension has been fully phased out, cohorts are
strictly better off than in the PAYG steady state, the start of the transition.
Implementing the FF pension outside steady state (before the capital stock has
converged to the steady state value associated with the PAYG pension b*) is possible
but has a longer transition period. FF contributions have to be phased in more
Figure 3a. Pareto-improving transition starting from and away from a PAYG steady state.
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gradually, and PAYG pensions phased out more slowly to satisfy the Pareto condition.
This is partly because the policy is introduced with retirees receiving the long run
PAYG pension b* even though the dynamics under the PAYG pension has not
worked itself out fully. Finally, it is seen that population growth makes the transition
more slow, see Figure 3b, but still possible. Note that the steady state is different
from the case reported in Figure 3a due to the population growth. With population
growth, the return difference between the PAYG scheme and the FF scheme is
smaller, and this explains why the transition period is longer. Note, in each case, the
transition to the FF scheme is completed within four to five generations.
5.6.2 Strength of myopia
Proposition 5 shows that a necessary and sufficient condition (for the phasing out of a
PAYG pension system and the phasing in of a FF one) to satisfy the Pareto criterion is








which may also be viewed as a condition on the strength of myopia needed.
Wang et al. (2016) report estimates of annual discount factors and present bias for
53 countries (see Figure 3 in their paper), where present bias is measured by the value




Figure 3b. Transition from a PAYG system to a FF system with population growth.
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(0, 1) is a discount factor. Our corresponding measure of myopia (25) is21
b∗
b
= 1+ g((d− d
31)/(1− d))
g+ g((d− d31)/(1− d)) .
Wang et al. (2016) report values of γ ranging from approximately 0.01 to 0.99 and δ
ranging from approximately 0.78 to 0.9. This implies β*/β∈ (1, 13.1) in the data.
Figure 3c plots 1/α from which it is clear what the minimum β*/β has to be for (25)
to be satisfied. For instance, when α≈ 0.4, (24) is satisfied for β*/β≈ 2.5 which lies
in the range reported in Wang et al. (2016).
5.6.3 Additional examples
We close by offering two additional examples that offer some reassurance of the
robustness of our findings. In the first example, ϕ = 0.99, β = 0.15, β* = 0.73, α = 0.21,
and A = 9. In this case, β*/β≈ 4.86 > 1/α. For this example, the optimal b in the
steady state is 0.04; the transition to FF is completed in three generations.
Figure 3c. Range of myopia satisfying the Pareto condition (24).
21Converting their results to our two period OG setting, we split the time horizon in their life-time utility
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The next example uses ϕ = 0.8, β = 0.15, β* = 0.8, α = 0.2, and A = 5. In this case, β*/
β≈ 5.3 > 1/α and the optimal b in the steady state is 0.13; the transition to FF takes
longer to complete, five generations.
Figure 3d. Fast transition.
Figure 3e. Slower transition.
194 Torben M. Andersen et al.
Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/dem.2020.13
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Landsbokasafn Islands - Haskolabokasafn, on 16 Nov 2021 at 14:09:28, subject to the
6. Conclusion
In the pension literature it is well-established that a PAYG pension has the advantage of
delivering pensions up front to current pensioners. The downside is that this scheme is
return-dominated by a funded scheme, which thus delivers higher long-run welfare.
However, the phasing in of such a scheme runs over several decades. This
disadvantage of the PAYG scheme has prompted the question whether it can be
phased out without hurting any cohorts along the transition. The literature has
largely answered this question in the negative.
This paper argues that the discussion on pension system transition has overlooked
the reasons why pension schemes were introduced in the first place. A key argument
is that agents do not save enough due to their present bias. Starting from this
observation, we show that it may be optimal to introduce a PAYG scheme in the
first place, not only because it is beneficial to the inaugural old, but also because it
addresses an undersaving problem. However, this scheme is return dominated by a
funded scheme. A switch to the latter scheme is a good idea but it would endanger
the incomes of the current generation of retirees. We show that a transition is
possible and yet no cohorts are worse off. In a way, our results speak to a “division
of labor” between PAYG and FF pensions: the former takes care of the needs of the
current retirees and the latter, because of the present bias, proves beneficial to both
current and future generations. This last statement has important implications for
pension policy design.
As outlined in the Introduction, our analysis informs the debate on pension policy
design. The classic conundrum facing policymakers has been the following. There is a
generation of current retirees that need a pension. At the same time, the current
working generation needs to be transferred to a FF scheme. How to get the young to
contribute to paying a pension to the initial generation of retirees and get them to
contribute to their own FF scheme? Conventional thinking stops here because the
burden on the transition generation from having to pay twice is believed to be too
much for any generation to have to endure. This has been the major sticking point
in the discussion about pension reform. Our analysis argues the transition may not
be as burdensome as believed.
In the current paper, we have focused on the basic differences between PAYG and
funded pension schemes to address the fundamental transition issue with a singular
focus on intergenerational distribution. Intragenerational heterogeneity has been
analyzed in the literature and distributional or risk-sharing motives have been used
to generate an argument for PAYG pensions even under dynamic efficiency.
Intragenerational heterogeneity would raise legitimate informational concerns
although, at least in theory, there can be a flat rate pension with minor informational
demands. More sophisticated schemes would have either contributions or benefits
differentiated across types. This is an interesting area of research in the future. Our
focus, of course, is on inadequacies in saving-for-retirement alone and the use of
mandated schemes to that end.
As we have shown, once the mandate is high enough, the voluntary retirement
saving disappears and further increases in the contribution mandate raises agents’
welfare. Problems would emerge if the government mandate was so aggressive as to
warrant borrowing by the young, but as Andersen and Bhattacharya (2019) have
shown, there is no welfare case to choose such a high mandate. An implication of
this idea is the following. Suppose there were some agents who did not suffer from
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time inconsistency. The welfare of such agents under laissez faire and under the
government mandate would be identical.
Finally, we take up a philosophical point. In our study, and in many others, the
assumption is that the government is paternalistic and evaluates welfare differently
than the citizens. In a sense, then, the Pareto-improving transition we derive is
possible from the government’s point of view (true preferences of the agents, not
their choice preferences).22 One may ask, why do we evaluate welfare from the point
of view of “true” utility? And if people are to vote on such schemes, would voters
use their choice or true preferences to decide? These are deep, philosophical
questions which deserve independent inquiry. In our defense, all we can say is the
following. First, ours is a normative analysis showing that such a transition is
possible; it is not a political-economy analysis. Second, the distinction between true
and choice preferences is, in one form or the other, standard in the normative
behavioral economics literature. Third, mandated pensions can be seen as an
institution—a commitment device. Forward-looking agents who recognize their own
self-control problems and see the commitment power of this institution may well
support this because it appeals to the “better angels of their nature.”
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Appendix A: The Danish experience
Funded pension schemes play a significant role in e.g., the Netherlands, Canada, and Denmark. In the
following, we outline the developments in Denmark as an example of a transition from a system relying
mainly on PAYG pensions to a system where funded pension schemes have taken on a substantial role.
While achieving a welfare state objective of ensuring some minimum income level for all pensioners,
there was a growing concern over the adequacy of the pensions, especially due to the implied low
replacement rates for medium- and high-income groups. Various steps were taken to address this
problem, but the pivotal change appeared in the late 1980s. The social partners—employers and
employees—took initiative to broaden and extend occupational funded pension schemes. Previously
supplementary pension scheme existed for particular groups e.g., highly educated, and the decisive move
was to extend this to most of the labor market. Figure 4 illustrates how contribution rates to funded
occupational pension schemes have developed since the early 1990s for large groups of blue- and
white-collar workers in the private labor market. Although these occupational pensions were voluntary
in the sense of being the outcome of negotiations between the social partners, participation is
mandatory for the individual worker. There is evidence that household net savings has increased as a
result of these schemes. In an influential study, Chetty et al. (2014) use Danish data and exploit
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increases in mandated pension contributions at job shifts to identify strong positive effects of mandated
contributions on household savings.
The increase in coverage and contribution rates has naturally implied an accumulation of substantial
funds now amounting to more than 200% of GDP, the highest level among OECD countries. It takes
several decades for occupational funded pension scheme to mature in the sense that contributions have
been made over an entire work career and pension benefits are enjoyed based on such contribution for
the entire pension period. The system is thus still maturing.
Figure 4 shows pension payments from contribution-based pension funds as a share of GDP, and the
increasing trend until about 2,045 reflects the maturation of the scheme. Interestingly, public expenditures
are falling as a result of individuals having larger private pensions via means-testing receive less in public
pensions, as well as increases retirement ages. Pensions from funded scheme would form 2,045 dominate
tax-financed pensions. Despite an increasing old-age dependency ratio on par with the OECD average,
public pension expenditures are falling and increasingly targeted low-income groups. It is noteworthy
that criteria for fiscal sustainability are satisfied and that the system delivers the highest replacement
rates among EU countries, see European Commission (2018, 2019).
Appendix B: Proof of Lemma 1
The contribution rate under a PAYG pension scheme is τt = bt, and true life-time utility therefore reads
V∗t (bt) = u(w− bt − s(bt))+ b∗u(Rs(bt+1)+ bt+1)
Notice that with exogenous factor prices we immediately reach steady state if implementing a
time-invariant pension (bt+j = b for all j≥ 0). Denote this level of PAYG benefits for b, which we
consider in the following (and, hence, suppress time subscripts). Agents are better-off under the PAYG
scheme compared to laissez-faire if
V∗(b) > V∗(0) (B.1)
Figure 4. Contribution rates, occupational labor market pensions, and total pension expenditures for public
sector and contribution-based pension funds. Note: Contribution rates applies to DI/CO collective
agreements. Since 2009 contribution rates have been identical for blue- and white-collar workers.
Expenditures: data 2015 onward are projected expenditures. Data source: Ministry of Finance (2017).
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Private savings given the level of pension, s(b), is u
′
(w− b− s(b)) = Rβu
′











We have, using (1)–(3), the results above and assuming time-invariant PAYG pensions system, that
(remember, R > 1 is assumed)
∂V∗(b)
∂b
=− u′(w− b− s(b)) 1+ ∂s(b)
∂b
[ ]








< 0 for s > 0
Hence, if the PAYG pension b should be welfare improving it is necessary that it be high enough that
private voluntary pensions savings is fully crowded out. Define b: s(b) = 0. If private savings is zero
(implying u
′
(w− b) > Rβu
′
(b)), the optimal b is a solution to max
b
u(w− b)+ b∗u(b) and the associated
first-order condition is u
′
(w− b) = β*u
′
(b). Hence, for b* > b being socially optimal when s = 0 it




(b) which requires β* > Rβ, i.e., with sufficiently strong myopia there is a
welfare case for a PAYG pension. Note, this is a necessary condition; for true utility to increase, it is
required that Ω*(b*) >Ω*(0), see Andersen and Bhattacharya (2011) for details.
Assuming a CES utility function u(c) = (c1−ϕ/(1− ϕ)), ϕ∈ (0, 1), we have that savings in equilibrium s




R+ (Rb)1/f w ⇒ c
y = R






1+ b∗1/f w ⇒ c
y = 1




Substituting these into the true utility function Ω* = ((cy)1−ϕ/(1− ϕ)) + β*((co)1−ϕ/(1− ϕ)) and
performing some calculations gives that for Ω*(b*) >Ω*(s) it is necessary and sufficient that (remember,







One period in the model is approximately 30 calendar years. Assuming an annual subjective rate of
time preference of about 10% gives the one period discount factor β≈ 0.06. Furthermore, assuming that
β* = 1 and R = 2.42, which implies annual real interest rates of 3%, satisfying the necessary condition β*
> Rβ, gives the following parameter values: β = 0.06; R = 2.43; β* = 1. These give the results shown in
Figure 5.
As can be seen from Figure 5a, the LHS > RHS holds for all ϕ∈ (0, 1) implying that a PAYG pensions
system is welfare improving. This result holds for β = 0.06 and it is interesting to see how the result depends
on the value of β.
The black line in Figure 5b shows the maximum value of ϕ, i.e., ϕ*, for which LHS > RHS for different β.
The line starts at β≈ 0.14 implying that LHS > RHS for all ϕ∈ (0, 1) and 0 < β≤ 0.14. For β > 0.14, ϕ* is
decreasing in β implying that the parameter space in ϕ for which LHS > RHS is decreasing in β. The
necessary condition β* > Rβ is fulfilled for all βs where LHS > RHS (which is logical since it is a
necessary condition).
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Appendix C: Proof of Lemma 3











Figure 5. (a) LHS and RHS and (b) ϕ*.
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With PAYG contribution bt+m+1 = b*, we have s = 0 implying ∂s( ⋅ )/∂dt+m = 0. Hence, evaluating the
welfare effect for dt+m = 0, bt+m+1 = b* and using that u
′







= −u′(w− b∗)+ Rb∗u′(b∗) = [R− 1]b∗u′(b∗) > 0 givenR > 1
Hence, on the margin, continuing the initial PAYG scheme and adding a (small) mandated FF pension
makes agents better off.
Appendix D: Proof of Proposition 2
Let
dt+m + b = (1+ k)b∗
dt+m+j + bt+m+j = (1+ k)b∗; j > 0
i.e., from the start of transition the contribution rate is raised relative to the PAYG world, κ > 0. This implies
dt+m+1 = (1 + κ)b*− bt+m+1 i.e., if we have a declining sequence for bt+m+1 we get an increasing sequence for
dt+m+1; if PAYG is phased out, the FF scheme is phased in. Using this in the equal utility condition in (16)
for period t +m gives
u(w− (1+ k)b∗)+ b∗u(Rkb∗+bt+m+1) = u(w− b∗)+ b∗u(b∗)
and given Lemma 3 there exists a κ > 0 ensuring bt+m+1 < b*. For period t +m + 1 the equal utility condition
can now be written as
u(w− bt+m+1 − dt+m+1)+ b∗u(Rdt+m+1 + bt+m+2) = u(w− b∗)+ b∗u(b∗)
or
u(w− (1+ k)b∗)+ b∗u(Rkb∗+R(b∗−bt+m+1)+ bt+m+2) = u(w− b∗)+ b∗u(b∗)
Since
u(w− (1+ k)b∗)+ b∗u(Rkb∗+bt+m+1) = u(w− b∗)+ b∗u(b∗)
it is implied
u(Rkb∗+R(b∗−bt+m+1)+ bt+m+2) = u(Rkb∗+bt+m+1)
and since b*− bt+m+1 > 0 this requires bt+m+2 < bt+m+1. Similar reasoning holds for subsequent periods. If d*
has not been reached along this transition path, then clearly it is possible to increase d to reach this level,
since no compensation is needed any longer when the PAYG pension has been eliminated.
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Appendix E: Proof of Lemma 4

















R′(kt+1)bu′(cot+1)+ R(kt+1)bu′′(cot+1)[R′(kt+1)kt+1 + R(kt+1)] + u′′(cyt )
< 0
It is assumed that the denominator in these expressions is strictly negative, which is under Assumption 6.
The steady state capital stock k for a given PAYG pension b is given by the k solving






1− ck(kb, b, b)





1− ck(kb, b, b)
< 0 for b ≥ 0
where it is assumed that 0 < ψk(k, β, b) < 1, which holds under Assumption 6.
Appendix F: Proof of Proposition 3
F.1 Part A
F.1.1 Steady state
True steady state welfare is
V∗=u(v(k(b))− k(b)− b)+ b∗u(R(k(b))k(b)+ b)




























(k)k (as can be seen from (18) and (19)). Since [β*− β]R(k)(∂k/∂bb=0) < 0 and R
′
(k)k
(∂k/∂bb=0) > 0 (using that (∂k/∂b)|b=0 < 0 and R
′
(k) < 0), a necessary condition for introducing a PAYG
pensions system to increase steady state welfare is
b∗ > R(k(0))b (F.1)
Assuming R(k) > 1, sufficient myopia is necessary for a PAYG pension to increase steady state welfare—
see Andersen and Bhattacharya (2011).
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F.2 Part B
As is well known, those old at the time of introduction of the PAYG scheme are made better off. The
welfare of an individual born in time t (kt = k) is V
∗
t =u(v(k)− kt+1 − b)+ b∗u(R(kt+1)kt+1 + b) and






























(co). The first term inside the bracket is strictly positive
under Proposition 3. The second term is strictly positive whereas the third term is strictly negative.
Furthermore, a sufficient condition for introducing a PAYG system in period t to have positive effects















Individuals born in period t + j and after
For subsequent periods t + j ( j≥ 1) we have
u′(v(kt+j)− kt+j+1 − b) = R(kt+j+1)bu′(R(kt+j+1)kt+j+1 + b) (F.3)
and the welfare of an individual born in period t + j ( j≥ 1) is
V∗t+j=u(v(kt+j)− kt+j+1 − b)+ b∗u(R(kt+j+1)kt+j+1 + b)















































Note that the first three terms are similar to the terms in the expression for (∂V∗t /∂b)|b=0. In addition,
there is now the term βRω
′
(k)(∂kt+j/∂b)|b=0 < 0 capturing the fact that the pension, by lowering capital, also
reduces the wage rate.
F.3 Part C
Does there exist a b > 0 ensuring that kb = k*, i.e., is it possible that a PAYG pensions scheme gives
the optimal steady state capital stock k*? Using steady state versions of (8) (using that s = k), (20), (18),
and (19) we have that k* and kb are given by solutions to u
′
(ω(k*)− k*) = R(k*)β*u
′
(R(k*)k*) and
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u
′
(ω(kb)− kb− b) = R(kb)βu
′











Using b > 0 and lim
b	0
LHS = 1 and ∂LHS
∂b < 0 it follows that LHS < 1 for all b > 0 and hence condition (F.4)
never holds. The optimal steady state capital stock (k*) is not attainable under myopia (β < β*) by an
appropriate choice of the PAYG pension (b).
Appendix G: Proof of Proposition 5
In the presence of a PAYG pension b the period t + j + 1 capital stock is given as the period t + j savings, i.e.,
kt+j+1 = s(kt+j, b). The true life-time utility for the cohort being young in period t + j ( j≥ 1) is:
V∗PAYGt+j = u(v(kt+j)− s(kt+j, b)− b)
+ b∗u(R(s(kt+j , b))s(kt+j, b)+ b)
where s(kt+j, b) gives equilibrium savings for the young in t + j.
Assume that transition starts in period t +m, and the mandated FF contribution to be exactly equal to
the voluntary savings in the PAYG regime, i.e., dt+m = s(kt+m, b). Since voluntary and mandatory FF savings
are perfect substitutes for s > 0 (mandated savings crowds out voluntary savings one-to-one), total savings
and thus the capital stock are unaffected. For dt+m≥ dt +m≡ s(kt+m, b) individuals are at the corner for
voluntary savings (s = 0 and kt+m+1 = dt+m), and the true life-time utility of cohort t +m can be written as




=− u′(v(kt+m)− dt+m − bt+m)
+ b∗u′(R(dt+m)dt+m + bt+m+1)[R′(dt+m)dt+m + R]
Assessing this for dt+m = dt +m we can exploit that u
′






= {−bu′(co)R+ b∗u′(co)[R′(dt+m)dt+m + R]}|dt+m=dt+m
= {u′(co)[b∗[R′(kt+m+1)kt+m+1 + R] − bR]}|dt+m=dt+m
It follows that ∂V∗TRANSITIONt+m /∂dt+m|dt+m = dt +m > 0 is ensured if β*[((R
′
(kt+m+1)kt+m+1)/R(kt+m+1))
+ 1]|dt+m = dt +m > β. Defining η(kt+m+1)≡ [((R
′
(kt+m+1)kt+m+1)/R(kt+m+1))]|dt+m = dt +m < 0, it is
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Sufficiently strong myopia (β* > β) is necessary and sufficient for phasing in of a FF pensions system
(dt+m > 0) to have positive welfare effects on an individual born in period t +m. Assuming that this
holds, it is possible to reduce the PAYG pension while satisfying the Pareto condition, i.e., there exists a
bt+m+1 < b and dt+m > 0 such that V
∗TRANSITION
t+m = V∗PAYGt+m . This can be seen as the first step in a
transition out of the PAYG scheme. Importantly, the above result holds for any initial situation, i.e., the
economy needs not to be in steady state.
Appendix H: Proof of Proposition 6
To work out a case where there is a complete transition from a PAYG to a FF pension under the Pareto
condition, assume that the economy is initially in steady state equilibrium with a PAYG pension b.
Denote the steady-state level of capital by kb.
Generation t +m
From Appendix G, we have that ∂V∗TRANSITIONt+m /∂dt+m|dt+m = dt +m > 0. Setting dt +m = kb, this
implies that introducing a transition to a FF scheme where the initial contribution to the FF scheme is
dt+m > k
b increases the welfare of generation t +m:
V∗TRANSITIONt+m = u(v(kb)− dt+m − b)+ b∗u(R(dt+m)dt+m + b)
> u(v(kb)− kb − b)+ b∗u(R(kb)kb + b)
= V∗PAYG
implying that there exists a bt+m+1 < b such that
V∗TRANSITIONt+m = u(v(kb)− dt+m − b)+ b∗u(R(dt+m)dt+m + bt+m+1)
= V∗PAYG
(H.1)
We therefore have that there exist dt+m > k
b and bt+m+1 < b such that generation t +m is no worse off
((H.1) holds) and the phasing in of FF and out of PAYG has started.
Generation t +m + 1
For generation t +m + 1 to be no worse off the following must hold:
V∗TRANSITIONt+m+1 = u(v(dt+m)− dt+m+1 − bt+m+1)+ b∗u(R(dt+m+1)dt+m+1 + bt+m+2)
= u(v(kb)− kb − b)+ b∗u(R(kb)kb + b)
= V∗PAYG
(H.2)
From (H.1), this requires
V∗TRANSITIONt+m+1 = u(v(dt+m)− dt+m+1 − bt+m+1)+ b∗u(R(dt+m+1)dt+m+1 + bt+m+2)
= u(v(kb)− dt+m − b)+ b∗u(R(dt+m)dt+m + bt+m+1)
= V∗TRANSITIONt+m
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Since dt+m > k
b we have that ω(dt+m) > ω(k
b) (remember that ω
′




u(v(dt+m)− dt+m − bt+m+1) > u(v(kb)− dt+m − b)
Therefore, there exists dt+m+1 > dt+m such that
u(v(dt+m)− dt+m+1 − bt+m+1) = u(v(kb)− dt+m − b)
Using Assumption 4 (which implies that ∂[R(kt)kt]/∂kt > 0):
u(R(dt+m+1)dt+m+1 + bt+m+1) > u(R(dt+m)dt+m + bt+m+1)
implying that there exists a bt+m+2 < bt+m+1 such that
u(R(dt+m+1)dt+m+1 + bt+m+2) = u(R(dt+m)dt+m + bt+m+1)
We therefore have that there exist dt+m+1 > dt+m > k
b and bt+m+2 < bt+m+1 < b such that generations t +m
and t +m + 1 are no worse off ((H.1) and (H.2) hold) and phasing in of FF and out of PAYG continues.
Generation t +m + 2
For generation t +m + 2 to be no worse off the following must hold:
V∗TRANSITIONt+m+2 = u(v(dt+m+1)− dt+m+2 − bt+m+2)+ b∗u(R(dt+m+2)dt+m+2 + bt+m+3)
= u(v(kb)− kb − b)+ b∗u(R(kb)kb + b)
= V∗PAYG
(H.3)
From (H.2), this requires:
V∗TRANSITIONt+m+2 = u(v(dt+m+1)− dt+m+2 − bt+m+2)+ b∗u(R(dt+m+2)dt+m+2 + bt+m+3)
= u(v(dt+m)− dt+m+1 − bt+m+1)+ b∗u(R(dt+m+1)dt+m+1 + bt+m+2)
= V∗TRANSITIONt+m+1
Since dt+m+1 > dt+m we have that ω(dt+m+1) > ω(dt+m). Using this, bt+m+2 < bt+m+1 and u
′
(,) > 0 we have:
u(v(dt+m+1)− dt+m+1 − bt+m+2) > u(v(dt+m)− dt+m+1 − bt+m+1)
Therefore, there exists dt+m+2 > dt+m+1 such that
u(v(dt+m+1)− dt+m+2 − bt+m+2) = u(v(dt+m)− dt+m+1 − bt+m+1)
Using Assumption 4 (which implies that ∂[R(kt)kt]/∂kt > 0):
u(R(dt+m+2)dt+m+2 + bt+m+2) > u(R(dt+m+1)dt+m+1 + bt+m+2)
implying that there exists a bt+m+3 < bt+m+2 such that
u(R(dt+m+2)dt+m+2 + bt+m+3) = u(R(dt+m+1)dt+m+1 + bt+m+2)
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We therefore have there exist dt+m+2 > dt+m+1 > dt+m > k
b and bt+m+3 < bt+m+2 < bt+m+1 < b such that
generations t +m, t +m + 1, and t +m + 2 are no worse off ((H.1), (H.2) hold (H.3) hold) and phasing
in of FF and out of PAYG continues.
Continuing this for the following generations gives the same result and we have decreasing sequence of
b and increasing sequence of d implying phasing out of the PAYG scheme and phasing in of the FF scheme
satisfying the Pareto condition.
Appendix I: The existence of Pareto-improving transition to a FF scheme starting
from an arbitrary date
Recall, the equilibrium law of motion for the capital stock is given by kt+1 = ψ(kt, β, b) where ∂kt+1/∂kt > 0,
∂kt+1/∂β > 0, and ∂kt+1/∂b < 0. Steady state capital stock is defined as the k solving k = ψ(k, β, b). The steady
state capital stock with and without a PAYG scheme under myopia are kb and k, respectively, and the steady
state capital stock without a PAYG scheme and in the absence of myopia is k*. From Lemma 4 of the paper,
we have that kb < k < k*.
Assume that the myopic economy is in a steady state without a PAYG scheme and the capital stock is k.
Then at time t a PAYG scheme is introduced with constant contribution and benefits b. This results in the
economy developing toward a new steady state with capital stock kb < k. Since ∂kt+1/∂kt > 0 and ∂kt+1/∂b < 0,
this results in the capital stock decreasing toward the new steady state k = kbt > kbt+1 > · · · > kb where true
life-time utility is
V∗PAYGt+j = u(v(kbt+j)− kbt+j+1 − b)+ b∗u(R(kbt+j+1)kbt+j+1 + b) for j ≥ 0 (I.1)
and the development of the capital stock is given by
u′(v(kbt+j)− kbt+j+1 − b) = R(kbt+j+1)bu′(R(kbt+j+1)kbt+j+1 + b) for j ≥ 0 (I.2)
or u′(cybt+j) = R(kbt+j+1)bu′(cobt+j+1) for j≥ 0.
FF scheme is introduced at time t +m with increasing contribution to the FF scheme dt+m < dt+m+1 < ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ < d
and decreasing contribution to the PAYG scheme bt+m = b > bt+m+1 > ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ > 0. At the time of introduction of
t +m, the economy can either be on transition path toward the PAYG steady state with capital stock kt+m or
at the PAYG steady state with capital stock kb, where kb < kt+m < k.
Generation t +m
We have that (due to private and FF pension savings being perfect substitutes) dt+m > kbt+m+1 is
necessary for generation t +m to be better off by introduction the FF scheme pushing private savings to
the zero corner. Hence, kdt+m+1 = dt+m > kbt+m+1 and true life-time utility of generation t +m is therefore
V∗TRANSITIONt+m = u(v(kbt+m)− dt+m − b)+ b∗u(R(dt+m)dt+m + bt+m+1) (I.3)
First-order Taylor approximation of (I.3) to the PAYG allocation in (I.2) gives
V̂∗TRANSITIONt+m =− u′(cybt+m)d̂t+m + b∗u′(cobt+m+1)[R′(kbt+m+1)kbt+m+1 + R(kbt+m+1)]d̂t+m
+ b∗u′(cobt+m+1)b̂t+m+1
= u′(cobt+m+1)R(kbt+m+1){b∗[1+ h(kbt+m+1)] − b}d̂t+m
+ b∗u′(cobt+m+1)b̂t+m+1
where V̂∗TRANSITIONt+m ; V
∗TRANSITION
t+m −V∗PAYGt+m , d̂t+m ; dt+m − kbt+m+1 and b̂t+m+1 ; bt+m+1 − b. Welfare
of an individual born in period t +m is therefore unchanged iff V̂∗TRANSITIONt+m = 0 which requires
R(kbt+m+1){b
∗[1+ h(kbt+m+1)] − b}d̂t+m + b∗b̂t+m+1 = 0
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∗[1+ h(kbt+m+1)] − b}
b∗
d̂t+m (I.4)
Hence, given Assumption 4 there exists a b̂t+m+1 < 0 or bt+m+1 < b = bt+m for every d̂t+m > 0 or
dt+m > kbt+m+1 satisfying (I.4). Therefore, the FF pension can be introduced and the PAYG pension
lowered such that life-time utility for individuals born in period t +m (cohort t +m) is unaffected
satisfying the Pareto criterion. Note that
(1) the initial contribution to the FF scheme is greater than the capital stock under the PAYG scheme
dt+m > kbt+m+1 and, hence, non-trivial, and
(2) this result holds independent of whether the economy is already at the PAYG steady state
(kbt+m = kbt+m+1 = kb) or on the transition path toward it (kbt+m > kbt+m+1 > kb) when the FF
scheme is introduced.
Generation t +m + j, j > 0
Since kdt+m+1 = dt+m and dt+m+j > dt+m we have that kdt+m+j+1 = dt+m+j implying that we have full
crowding out of private savings. True life-time welfare of generation t +m + j can therefore be written as
V∗TRANSITIONt+m+j = u(v(dt+m+j−1)− dt+m+j − bt+m+j)
+ b∗u(R(dt+m+j)dt+m+j + bt+m+j+1) for j > 0
(I.5)
The benefit from introducing the FF scheme for generation t +m + j is given by a first-order Taylor
approximation:
V̂∗TRANSITIONt+m+j = V∗TRANSITIONt+m+j −V∗PAYGt+m+j ,
i.e., the difference between true life-time utility from introducing the FF scheme and the true life-time
utility under the PAYG scheme, and is here calculated as a first-order Taylor approximation of (I.5) to
the PAYG allocation in (I.2). Following an introduction of the FF scheme the economy starts to diverge
away from its PAYG path with increasing capital stock whereas the capital stock decreases under the
PAYG scheme (kdt+m+j+1 = dt+m+j > dt+m > kbt+m+1 > kbt+m+j+1). This questions whether it is appropriate
to approximate (I.5) to the PAYG allocation in (I.2) when j > 0. We therefore write the benefits as the















and the first one gives the true life-time utility from introducing the FF scheme and the second gives the
true life-time utility of from the PAYG scheme, both approximated to the true life-time utility of generation
t +m under the PAYG scheme, under which capital stock accumulation is given by
u′(v(kbt+m)− kbt+m+1 − b) = R(kbt+m+1)bu′(R(kbt+m+1)kbt+m+1 + b) (I.6)
or
u′(cybt+m) = R(kbt+m+1)bu′(cobt+m+1)
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First-order Taylor approximation of (I.5) and (I.1) to (I.6) gives
Ṽ
∗TRANSITION
t+m+j = u′(cybt+m)v′(kbt+m)d̂t+m+j−1 − u′(cybt+m)d̂t+m+j − u′(cybt+m)b̂t+m+j
+ b∗u′(cobt+m+1)[R′(kbt+m+1)kbt+m+1 + R(kbt+m+1)]̂dt+m+j + b∗u′(cobt+m+1)b̂t+m+j+1
= u′(cobt+m+1)
R(kbt+m+1)b[v′(kbt+m)d̂t+m+j−1 − b̂t+m+j]





t+m+j = u′(cybt+m)v′(kbt+m)k̂bt+m+j − u′(cybt+m)k̂bt+m+j+1






+R(kbt+m+1){b∗[1+ h(kbt+m+1)] − b}k̂bt+m+j+1
{ }
where d̂t+m+j−1 ; dt+m+j−1 − kbt+m, d̂t+m+j ; dt+m+j − kbt+m+1, b̂t+m+j ; bt+m+j − b,
b̂t+m+j+1 ; bt+m+j+1 − b, k̂bt+m+j ; kbt+m+j − kbt+m, and k̂bt+m+j+1 ; kbt+m+j+1 − kbt+m+1.
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where it is used that b̂t+m+j ; bt+m+j − b, k̂bt+m+j − d̂t+m+j−1 = (kbt+m+j − kbt+m)− (dt+m+j−1−
kbt+m) = kbt+m+j − dt+m+j−1, and k̂bt+m+j+1 − d̂t+m+j = (kbt+m+j+1 − kbt+m+1)− (dt+m+j − kbt+m+1) =


















where Dkbt+m+j ; k
b
t+m+j − kbt+m+j−1 etc.
Individuals born in period t +m + 1 ( j = 1)

















We have that ((R(kbt+m+1)bv
′(kbt+m))/b




−b})/b∗) > 0 given Assumption 4 and ((R(kbt+m+1)b)/b∗) > 0. Since Dkbt+m+1 < 0, Dkbt+m+2 < 0 and we
have from above that there exists a Δbt+m+1 = bt+m+1− bt+m = bt+m+1− b < 0 for Ddt+m = dt+m − dt+m−1 =
dt+m > kbt+m+1 > 0 such that the true life-time utility of generation t +m is unaffected, it follows that there
exists Δbt+m+2 < 0 for every Δdt+m+1 > 0 such that the true life-time utility of generation t +m + 1 is
unaffected.
We have therefore shown that there exists bt+m = b > bt+m+1 > bt+m+2 and dt+m < dt+m+1 satisfying the
Pareto criterion. Note that this result holds independent of whether the economy would have been at
the PAYG steady state (Dkbt+m+2 = Dkbt+m+1 = 0) or on the transition path toward it (Dkbt+m+2 < 0,
Dkbt+m+1 < 0) in the absence of the FF scheme being introduced.
Individuals born in period t +m + 2 ( j = 2)
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Since Dkbt+m+2 < 0, Dk
b
t+m+3 < 0 and we have from above that there exists a Δbt+m+2 < 0 for Δdt+m+1 > 0
such that the true life-time utility of generations t +m and t +m + 1 are unaffected, it follows that there
exists Δbt+m+3 < 0 for every Δdt+m+2 > 0 such that the true life-time utility of generation t +m + 2 is
unaffected.
We have therefore shown that there exists bt+m = b > bt+m+1 > bt+m+2 > bt+m+3 and dt+m < dt+m+1 < dt+m+2
satisfying the Pareto criterion. Note, this result holds independent of whether the economy would have
been at the PAYG steady state (Dkbt+m+3 = Dkbt+m+2 = 0) or on the transition path toward it
(Dkbt+m+3 <, Dk
b
t+m+2 < 0) in the absence of the FF scheme being introduced.
Individuals born in period t +m + j ( j > 2)
Repeating the above for generations t +m + 3, t +m + 4, …, we have that there exist sequences bt+m = b
> bt+m+1 > bt+m+2 > bt+m+3 > ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ > 0 and dt+m < dt+m+1 < dt+m+2 < ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ < d satisfying the Pareto criterion
showing that the PAYG scheme can be phased out and a FF scheme phased in without decreasing the
true life-time utility of any generation during the transition.
Cite this article: Andersen TM, Bhattacharya J, Gestsson MH (2021). Pareto-improving transition to fully
funded pensions under myopia. Journal of Demographic Economics 87, 169–212. https://doi.org/10.1017/
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